Ionactive Consulting Blog

Blogs are written for all sorts of reasons - marketing, news analysis and comment, getting something off your chest and so on. This blog has served a number of purposes over the last few years - many articles have been clearly radiation protection related, but others have looked at my hobbies (e.g. cooking and music), and a few are of a more personal nature involving aspects of my family life (e.g. playing in the snow with the kids).

Whatever the driver for writing a blog post - there is an element of ‘therapy' involved - it feels good to write down thoughts and views, if there is an audience out there that likes to read those views then even better.

House burgled

This entry is one of those ‘therapy' moments - we were burgled. Yes, this goes on all the time and perhaps some of you have experienced the same. However, it is only when it actually happens to you that you realise the effects it can produce - anger, ‘why me', stress, ‘if only' ....

I can say from the outset that the most important thing in the world is my family - my wife and the boys. Material possessions are important but way down the league table - the fact that the family came to no physical harm and were not present when this event occurred is a great relief. No physical harm is one thing - mental harm is something altogether more difficult to define and is perhaps longer lasting. The feeling of anger and resentment, the feeling that someone has been in your house and trashed it, is less tangible but no less painful. So what happened?

The Incident

We live in a pleasant quiet residential road in Berkshire. We left the house locked up at 1615 on Monday afternoon to drop the kids off at their Grandparents. My wife and I were going to cook a late Valentine's Dinner - a spicy chicken dish I recall. We returned to the house at around 1845 and knew something was wrong before we even arrived back on the driveway - my wife could see the house from the main road and commented that my youngest son's bedroom light was on. As we got onto the driveway a feeling that I can only describe as nausea came over us. There was the house - every curtain and blind was drawn (not how we left it) and every light appeared to be on.

At this point I think I thought ‘something is missing here' - but could not define that thought further. We opened the front door (was all locked up and deadlocked). Upon opening the door we immediately knew the worst - we could see all the doors leading from the hall were open, all lights were on and items were strewn across the floor. Through this feeling of nausea, panic and a certain anxiety that someone might still be in the house (although for some reason I worried less about that at the time), we began to look around.

What we found

Kitchen - all the drawers were open and items all over the place. The rice tin (an old biscuit tin) was open and bent - does the thief still believe that cash is kept in a biscuit tin? If you still do this then please don't! The French Doors at the back of the kitchen were open - that was the point of entry. They had been forced open - we are talking about a modern high security 7 point locking door that was secured before we left earlier in the afternoon.

Exploring further we looked in the lounge and the flat screen TV was gone - the French Doors in the lounge had been opened from the inside using keys that we had ‘hidden'. Things got a whole lot worse as we moved up stairs. Every item in every one of the four bedrooms had been turned upside down. Three laptops had been taken from one room, my wife's jewellery (valuable, sentimental and both) had been taken. The IPod had gone. Every drawer had been emptied on the bed - the place was wrecked.

What do they expect to find in a 6 year / 3 year old boys room??

The most upsetting thing for both of us was the boys' rooms - thankfully they are too young to be reading this blog and we have kept this information from them. Their rooms had been turned upside down - all the drawers of clothes, books, toys were emptied onto the floor. Why - I guess they were looking for hidden objects - but why - do they not have kids.... were they not kids themselves at some point in the past?

RPA 418

I said earlier that ‘something was missing here' - My car, an Audi A5 with registration ‘RPA 418' - that had gone too - stolen from the driveway. They must have found the hidden set of spare keys.

Initial Police Response

The look around the house took less than a minute - less time than it is taking to read this blog. We phoned the police - 999. Was immediately told they would ring back as this number was only for emergencies... (how many of you keep your local police station number to hand for an event like this ??). From this point on I cannot fault the initial response of the police at all. Two officers arrived within less than 10 minutes - they were courteous, professional with an appropriate degree of empathy - my only comment is that I think they had seen this many times before. They checked out the house, phoned for the forensics team, examined the outside of the property and made door to door enquiries.

They were shocked at the lack of damage to the rear forced door - damage was clearly visible but the robbers had not broken the door - simply appeared to have forced the two halves of the door apart enough to disengage the locking mechanisms (also doing the same top and bottom). We were actually able to close and relock the door - which is not reassuring since you know that the exact same thing could happen again. [We have had the doors examined by two separate experts and they concede that this could happen to anyone with similar doors - please do not assume that this type of modern UPVC door is secure, if they want to get in they will].

What goes through their mind (they do have a mind??)

The police were not able to get any finger prints (burglars were wearing gloves it seems). They were able to identify four different sets of foot prints on the kitchen tiled floor. So there were four of them it seems - four sad, selfish, worthless individuals. Did these four individuals not see:

• the Valentines day cards they dropped into the sink as they closed the front kitchen blind
• the pictures of our boys, either side of the TV they took
• the family pictures, the smiles and happy faces

They did and they clearly felt nothing. I wish I could understand the mindset of these people - what drives them? Is it the recession - are they on the poverty line and need to steal goods to buy bread and milk for their poor family? Are they a modern day Robin Hood - stealing from those who are apparently ‘doing ok' (i.e. working very hard as a family) to buy meal vouchers for those less fortunate? Are they feeding a drugs habit and need the goods to fund their next fix?

Or, are they simply selfish and want something for nothing? I have no idea which it is - but I wish I knew. I wish I could understand what drives someone to take a risk and do this on a late Monday afternoon with people coming home from work. We could so easily have come back whilst they were midway through their break in.

Moving on

So, it is now Friday Morning. Today is the first day where I can honestly say I intend to ‘work'. My clients have been understanding and there has been so much to sort out - new locks and a lot of learning to do (more of that in a moment). The boys know ‘a man has taken the TV and daddies car' - and that is it, how I envy their innocent mind. My oldest son is already interesting in looking for a new car for me (the police incidentally do not hold out much hope of getting it back). I spent an hour yesterday with just my youngest son playing rough and tumble on the floor. How I love them both - they will grow up to be honourable, kind and caring adults.

My wife has taken this as well as can be expected. I think she finds the violation of her family and house hard to accept. She had spent most of Monday doing housework and making the family home what it is - a great place to be. To come home and find all that turned upside down is hard to take. I know she worries they will come back again - I need to now work on reassuring her that they will not. Many items of sentimental value were taken from her and I know that hurts.

Learning points

So, to some learning points. Everything in this blog has been communicated to the police and therefore to the insurance company. I put the following points down in the full knowledge that this is public.

Firstly - the house was secure and locked up. However, as we were in a rush to leave we did not set the alarm. We normally do - but on this occasion we simply did not - this is, by the way, on the very day that the alarm was serviced and tested. We can say or think the ‘if only' phrase for evermore but it does not change the fact. Therefore, if you do have a house alarm please ensure you use it every single time you leave the house - this includes late afternoon when you are only planning to be out for an hour.

Secondly - it is a sad fact but you have to think like a burglar. Where will they look? What are they after? What is their motive (small items, expensive items). Hiding spare car keys, door keys etc has got to be very carefully planned - if they do get into the house then they are going to look in all the obvious (and perhaps less obvious) places. I have not thought this one through yet so if you have any ideas feel free to pass them on.

Thirdly - think about security starting outside and working in - from the perimeter of the property. Each security measure / inconvenience / time delay that you put in place between the perimeter of the property (i.e. the road / garden inwards) and your home should make it less attractive.

Forth - pardon me if this is going to sound unjust - we have had several sets of workman doing work around the house over the last view weeks (home office etc etc). Please do not assume anything and be careful what you say. There is no direct evidence to suggest that anyone had ‘motives', but when you look at the specifics of our case (many of which I have deliberately left out of the blog), you cannot help wondering how did they ‘know certain things'.

• The type of gate lock
• The lighting (which we now know was deliberately disabled a few days before the event)
• The type of back door
• The contents of the house (e.g. TV could only be seen from the back garden)
• The time of day we come and go - the routine
• etc

Now this has happened we are perhaps going overboard with security and I am of course not going to describe that all in detail - suffice to say .. security lights, more locks, new rear security doors, a new way of storing valuables and keys etc are all part of the mix. I know that nothing offers a guarantee that theft is preventable, but it lowers the risk. Indeed, it is similar to the radiation ALARP principle really - or ASARP (as secure as reasonably practicable).

Finally - just to say - I really hope this does not happen to you, it is a truly awful experience. Do have a look at your physical security measures and think about where you store your valuables and similar.

Blog articles on radiation protection, Asian cooking and progressive rock music will return shortly...

Of late there have been many stories in the media regarding ionising radiation. Some have been related to new build nuclear power stations, others have looked at the excessive use of CT scans in the US, and yet others have discussed the use of back scatter security technology at airports. Indeed, I cannot remember when so many stories were circulating at the same time. Furthermore, if you have checked out our blog entries below you will see were have also got in on the act - particularly concerning recent articles from the two camps ‘radiation is not as bad for you as you think' all the way to ‘radiation does much more damaged than you think'.

One theme which runs through many of these stories / articles is risk comparison - i.e. trying to relate one unfamiliar risk with one that we all find more familiar. Of course that is an open statement because I am familiar with radiation risk (it is my job), whereas I am much less certain about financial risk (even though the basic principles may well be similar). Therefore a comparison between two or more risks will not work for everyone in the same way - particularly if the individual has an agenda, is a stakeholder, or perhaps has had a bad experience which muddies the water. This can be developed further by considering an individual's ‘irrational response' to risk, and comparing to someone else that finds the same risk familiar (and which can be placed in context with other surrounding risks).

Mark Ramsay and flying



Take my experience of flying - I have to fly quite a lot as a consultant and it is something I am familiar with. That said, to say I do not particularly enjoy flying in an understatement. I am not one of those individuals who grips the seat in terror, sweats and never leaves the seat - but I do have some traits that some of you might find irrational. Here are some of them:

• I always book flights with specific seats
• I always check-in online as soon as it is open - to get an aisle seat
• I do this as soon as I can to be near the front of the plane
• During take-off I have fingers crossed - always released once we get airborne
• I avoid drinking too much (little use of toilet)

For some that fly a lot for business or pleasure, my traits above might seem excessive - but apart from admitting them on line (gulp), I am pretty certain I do not look any different to any other calmer passenger. Once we are cruising I tend to relax and get on with work - resigned to the fact that should something go wrong then I am unlikely to know much about it!

So where has the above come from - a bad experience flying? Not that I can remember - for me it is just one of those things. I have tried to make myself feel better by looking at air accident statistics - that did not help much. I have also looked at the physics of flying ... ‘how do they keep up in the sky'. That has not helped much either. It is not as if I am a nervous or anxious person - whilst I always get psyched up before I start training, I do not feel stressed or anxious about this - and I know many who have openly said they could not stand for three days in front of a group of people and be the focus during that time. So I have to stick with the fact that flying in an irrational fear that I deal with - 'safest form of transport' they all say - well whatever you say!!

Ionising Radiation Risk

So I turn to something that is more familiar to me - ionising radiation risk. Whilst I know many who have a healthy respect for radiation, and do not ‘fear it', I know of many that find it troubling. Some find it troubling even when you start to use risk comparators to place the risk in a more familiar context - others find this approach comforting. Take smoking as an example - I often use the following comparison (which numerically could be contested but is in the right ball park):

Fatal cancer risk from smoking 40 cigarettes - comparable to receiving a whole body dose of 1mSv of ionising radiation (1000 μSv).

You can develop the comparisons in many ways (which make all sorts of assumptions about LNT etc):

• UK average annual exposure to background / medical ionising radiation is 2700 μSv (108 cigarettes)
• 20/day smoker over a year - comparable to receiving 183 mSv whole body dose in same period
• Fire Fighter dose to save a life (100mSv) = 4000 cigarettes (200 days for 20/day smoker)
• Annual legal limit (20mSv) = 800 cigarettes

You get the general idea - this helps some, but does little to help others. I do not think this has anything to do with being a smoker or not, or the fact that smoking is something you do by choice. I think it is simply that smoking is a tangible thing you can understand, whereas ionising radiation is not.

Back scatter x-ray systems



The Rapiscan Secure 1000 Single Pose - for info go here.

Back scatter x-ray technology has been in the news of late - driven mainly by the ‘underpants' bomber. Those that have an anxiety about using such a device tend to fall into the privacy camp, the radiation safety camps - or both. The UK Department for Transport (DfT) has just released a document by the UK Health Protection Agency (HPA) which looks at back scatter radiation risk comparisons. This document can be found at the link below:

Assessment of comparative ionising radiation doses from the use of rapiscan secure 1000 x-ray backscatter body scanner

They acknowledge that statistics in the form of ‘1:20' or ‘5% per Sv' are not a lot of help to many. They have taken a different approach and compared familiar (likely and not so likely) risks as ‘equivalent number of scans'. For example, the claimed dose per single scan from a back scatter machine discussed in the above report is 0.02 μSv. The risk of this scan has been compared in the following way (only some examples are shown below, read the above report for the rest):

Activity	Cause of death	Fatality risk
Risk of accidental death in a school pupil while at school (UK annual rate, ref. ROSPA data)	Fatal accident	0.000,000,44 =0.000,044 % = 1 in 2,300,000 Risk = x70 backscatter scan risk
Average annual background radiation in the UK Effective radiation dose =2,700 µSv	Fatal lifetime cancer risk induced by exposure to background radiation (assumed to be 0.05 (5%) per Sv)	0.000,1 = 0.01 % = 1 in 10,000 Risk = x 16,600 backscatter scan risk
Risk of a mother dying during pregnancy or soon after in the UK (UK Office for National Statistics)	All causes directly and indirectly related to the pregnancy	0.000,15 = 0.015 % =1 in 6,700 Risk = x 25,000 backscatter scan risk

(In the second line entry I believe the risk should be written as 1 in 7400 - rounded - but perhaps they have rounded to 1 in 10,000 for good measure?).

So, notwithstanding a couple of suspect figures in the above table, they have taken a familiar tangible risk and compared directly to a tangible security back scatter scan. Do you think this helps - it would help me (if I were worried).

Using my own data above for cigarettes, here is another one to finish:

1 scan (assumed 0.02 μSv) = 0.08% of a cigarette, which is < 0.1mm (average length) or a PUFF (but only if you inhale).

(Note: you should seek specific dose information from the scanner supplier direct - the figures above are for illustration only)

(New resource for Ionactive Radiation Safety Training - see further below)


This is taken from the IAEA event log.

The Incident - Overexposure in the field of radiography (27/07/2009)

(Note: the incident was reported to IAEA 20/1/2010)

 

(Poland). The incident happened during radiography work with Gammamat model TSI-3, containing Ir-192 source with activity at the time 2.6 TBq (70.2 Ci). The technician operating remote crank mechanism was not able to crank in the source to the shielded position. He asked for help company’s radiation protection inspector (RPI). The RPI with the second worker came in the hurry, forgetting to take their individual dosemeters. The RPI had taken his own decision to return the source to the shielded position by manually grapping the guide tube and force the source to move to the shielded container. The source was returned back to the safe position. The incident was on July 27th, but information about it was released by the company on 28  September, when the radiation burns of RPI became advanced [Ionactive emphasis]. The National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA) Regulatory Inspectors  investigated the incident in October and finished it in December. There were no doses obtained by the public. The doses of the workers were assessed on the basis of blood test (biodosimetry) and reconstruction of the event was based on the statements of involved workers. The doses of RPI were approximated as: whole body dose 365 mSv and externity effective [Ionactive: probably means extremity / equivalent dose] dose about 5 Sv. The doses of second worker were assessed by biodosimetry examination as whole body dose 182 mSv and externity dose about 2,3 Sv. The blood tests were performed by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection in Warsaw from blood samples taken at the beginning of October and repeated at the beginning of November.

The incident log can be read at the following link: IAEA News (You may need to log in as a guest).

Ionactive Comment

Oh dear ... first recorded event of 2010 (incident was in 2009) and it is industrial radiography again. What sets this apart from some of the other incidents is the person exposed was the very person who would be relied upon to do the right thing (i.e. the company radiation protection inspector, or RPI).

As always, we do not have all the facts here - so this comment and analysis should be used for general interest / educational purposes.

Looking at the Polish National Atomic Energy Agency Atomic Law page it appears that the RPI is actually the Radiological Protection Inspector (at least defined more recently, since the initial Atomic Law Act came into force in November 2000 and there have been several amendments since). From what I can gather the RPI should meet the standard of a Qualified Expert (e.g. as define in the EURATOM Basic Safety Standards), which in the UK is Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA). Suffice to say, the RPI is (or should be) the person relied upon by an organisation using ionising radiation sources to give suitable and sufficient advice - and mostly certainly in an incident situation provide advice to minimise exposures!

No dosimetry

The report notes that the RPI (and second worker) arrived in a hurry and did not have their dosimeters with them. What is not clear is if the dosimeters were active (i.e. real time dose alarming etc) or if they were passive. If they were passive (e.g. film badge or similar) then they would have provided no clue to the actual radiation fields that were being experienced. If they were active then at least they would know (one would hope...) that significant radiation dose rates existed and take appropriate action. However, in this case no dosimetry was worn so no early warning could be given - neither could a direct assessment of exposure be made (resorting instead to blood assessment and incident reconstruction).

No workplace dose rate monitoring

What is not specifically mentioned, and therefore we have to assume was absent, is any form of workplace / field monitoring (i.e. dose rate instrument). As this was field (i.e. site) radiography it is really quite disturbing that a dose rate instrument was not available for use. If it was available (but not noted in the report), and indeed used, then either it did not work or was off scale - but in any case any information it might have supplied was not acted upon by the RPI or other workers.

Dose Rates from Ir-192

The dose rates from an exposed and un-collimated 2.6TBq Ir-192 source at the following distances are as follows 118 Sv/h (5 cm), 29.5 Sv/h (10 cm), 1.2 Sv/h (50cm), 294 mSv/h (100cm) and 73 mSv/h (200cm). These values should be taken as approximate and have been rounded. We can see that by any standard the dose rates are considerable and no person, even in an incident recovery situation, should be exposed to these levels where deterministic effects are possible.

At 5 cm from the source the dose rate is near 2 Sv/min - therefore I think it is unlikely that the RPI grabbed the source or came any closer than 5cm from it (thankfully!!). Clearly the inverse square relationship is unreliable very near the source, suffice to say that one would be looking at perhaps > 1 Sv/second very close to it. Whilst the interpretation of extremity dose in the report is not clear, I believe it to mean 5 Sv to the fingers or hand - if that is so then it supports the view that the source was never held directly (or placed closed to the hand). The generally accepted threshold for deterministic skin effects are 3 Gy - clearly this was exceeded and I do wonder if my own interpretation of the report is correct since ‘radiation burns .... became advanced' might imply a substantially larger dose (e.g. Temporary Depilation, Permanent Depilation and Desquamation appear progressively in the range of about 4-20 Gy).

With respect to whole body effective dose, the report claims an exposure to the RPI 365 mSv. We have no information about how far away he was from the source, but it is probably unlikely that the individual worked around the source for more than a few minutes. He would need to have been close enough to the shielding container in order to feed the source back in - perhaps between 10-50 cm away. Therefore his resident time of exposure (assuming his body is static) might be somewhere between < 1minute up to perhaps 18 minutes. The same could also be said for the second worker who was also exposed (182 mSv effective whole body dose).

Was the RPI suitable?

Whatever the true turn of events, both individuals must surely have known the risk they were facing - or did they? I would like to think that any qualified (certificated) RPA in the UK would be able to handle this situation in a safe manner following the ALARP principle (as low as reasonably practicable). However, the UK recognises the concept of ‘suitable RPA' - that is a RPA who not only satisfies the core competence requirements to be a RPA, but also shows they have suitable and sufficient experience in a particular area of radiation safety. Therefore, for example, it might be the case that a RPA who only works with x-ray systems might not be competent to advise on the use of unsealed radioactive materials. However in this particular case, would a RPA with no experience what so ever make the same mistakes as appears the RPI did? I would like to think not - but the question still remains, was the RPI suitable to advise on this area of work (or indeed actually physically move the source?).

What about contingency

Notwithstanding the suitability or competence of the RPI response to the incident, a question is also raised regarding contingency. There does not appear to be much evidence of any contingency plan - particularly since a failure of the source to retract is clearly reasonably foreseeable. One wonders why they did not move to a safe distance and ponder their next move if such a plan was lacking. Or indeed, was a plan actually in place, but was then not followed? These of course are questions that we cannot answer and it is best not to take the assumptions any further. What is clear is that the job must have been badly planned and not supervised by a competent person. It goes without saying that an event such as this is the UK would bring out the HSE in force.

Regulator Notification

Talking of regulators and notifications, the incident appears to have been compounded by a rather casual notification. The actual incident took place on July 27th 2009, but information was only released by the company on the 28th September 2009 - presumably to the National Atomic Energy Agency (NAEA) Regulatory Inspectors. What is shocking, but may only be implied by the way the report is written, is that the notification appears to have been prompted by the radiation injury rather than by any standard protocol (‘...when the radiation burns of RPI became advanced...').

This is clearly another case study in how not to undertake industrial radiography.

As we have mentioned many times before, site (or field) radiography can be undertaken completely safely with the right people, following the correct procedures and best practice in radiation protection. However, where possible such work should be conducted in an enclosure - i.e. ‘enclosure radiography'.

Which brings us nicely on to some new resource....

Open top industrial radiograph bay - fly through

We have two projects on the go at the moment - both being undertaken by Grallator Limited. The first of these, a fly around and inside a medical radiotherapy bunker has already been partly featured in an earlier blog. This medical resource will be uploaded once an audio track has been added.

The second project is in our opinion very impressive indeed. We have commissioned a fly around and inside an open-top radiography bay. The aim of this resource is two-fold. Firstly it will be used (in a slightly altered form) by one of our clients to provide awareness training to factory workers who will be working around the bay (but not involved with radiography). The fly around highlights key safety features like the emergency pull cables, the gate interlocks, and external operating panel and warning lights. The second aim is to highlight sky-shine / scatter (or rather lack of) in the areas where the factory workers will be based. It will also show why working above a certain height within a certain distance from the bay is prohibited.

The resource is still in the early stages but I am grateful to Grallator for letting me have these test renders. I think you will agree that the detail is very impressive. First, take a look at this video interlock test sequence - neat!




What follows below are some static render test shots.

The radiography bay locking system




The radiography bay control systems and warning lights

 

 

Check back often for the latest news on this new radiation safety resource.

Also check out Grallator Limited too.

 

Came across this earlier today - some vintage animation on the atomic age: ‘A is for Atom'. For those that follow Ionactive closely you will know we have some excellent video resource produced for us by the ever innovative Grallator Limited. You can see this resource in two places: either visit our Ionactive Video Resource pages or have a look at our YouTube IonactiveConsulting Channel.

However, spare a thought for those that knew the science (well some of it), but did not have access to the types of computer technology that we might take for granted today (i.e. when producing radiation protection resource).

‘A is for Atom' was sponsored by GE (General Electric) in 1953 and produced by John Sutherland. The animated film is a real period piece and the narration is just what would be expected from the 50's!

The resource introduces Dr Atom (see above) who explains the structure of the atom and how these make the elements (with the possibility of many isotopes). Dr Atom then explores the history of atomic energy (up to the 50's of course!), looking at nuclear fission (power production and nuclear weapons). Some wild ideas like nuclear powered planes are discussed as if they might be just around the corner (if only they knew!).



Enjoy!

A is for Atom Part 1




A is for Atom Part 2

In this blog article:

• Frying travellers with x-rays
• Simon Jenkins (Guardian) article (proliferation of nuclear panic)
• Prof Wade Allison (Radiation and Reason)
• Greenpeace
• Added 11/1/2009 'Irrational fears give nuclear power a bad name'

It's like waiting for the bus, you wait for ages and nothing arrives, and then several come at once. This blog article has been updated (11/01/2009) to acknowledge another new article in the Guardian ‘Irrational fears give nuclear power a bad name, says Oxford scientist'. I have left main body of this blog entry as it was, but have inserted some new comments at the bottom in relation to this latest article.

Well that was the week that wasn't as far as Ionactive is concerned. Whilst we only had two planned visits for the first week of 2010, one visit was to deliver some bespoke Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) refresher training to a company in Hull. As always, bespoke training takes that bit more planning and effort - to have all the newly created folders in the car boot and ready to go on Tuesday, and then for the snow to arrive, is a real bind.



The training was based around NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials), or to be more precise TENORM, where TE means Technically Enhanced.

Radiation matters in the media

The general subject matter of this training course could not really come at a more opportune time - especially as ‘radiation matters' have been in the news of late. For example, x-ray security scanners for whole body surveillance at airports have been in the media. The two main issues raised seem to be ‘human rights' (modesty ?) and radiation safety. With respect to radiation safety this has been split between media articles that report (generally) that there is nothing to worry about, and the more fringe groups (civil rights?) who claim that these machines will lead to cancers, DNA damage and similar.

The problem I have found with some of these groups is that there appears to be no element of listening to reason or even simple debate - most who write articles such as 'Full-Body Scanners to Fry Travellers With Radiation', and the many who leave comments, are very fixed in their views.

You will note we have left comments on the article under the name ‘Mark'. The thing is, I do not deny that currently radiation protection is based on the assumption of a direct linear relationship between radiation dose and effect with no threshold. This relationship, a stochastic effect based on probability, is the corner stone of the International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) and forms the basis of ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) internationally, which roughly translates into the UK concept of ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable).

The very negative views in the above article say again and again words to the effect of (and I quote an example here) ‘Every little hit has the chance to cause a cancer. Adding to the overall lifetime ionizing radiation load to every traveler (old and young people are more susceptible to the dangers) without knowing that there is a real upside is crazy'. I have no concern about the general anxiety regarding the usefulness (or otherwise) of x-ray screening (to avoid more exploding underpants) since there is likely a good debate to be had (and I am not a security expert). I do however worry about anxiety based around receiving such a trivial dose of ionising radiation.

Radiation Risk - seeing the Wood for the Trees?

The problem with the example response quoted, and there are many similar ones, is that they cannot see the wood for the trees - even when one tries to show them the picture as clearly as possible. In one of my responses, and featured in a recent blog entry below, was an example of a radiation detector showing the dose rate at ground level and the dose rate at 36,000 (I note that the monitor is not a great choice of instrument for natural cosmic radiation - but it is a good relative comparator).

In a reply in the above mentioned article I point out that my example dose rate (at 36,000 feet) would yield a radiation exposure over a period of less than one minute, which would be comparable to what you might receive if you were to be scanned by an x-ray back scatter unit. The point I made here was not acknowledged or accepted - just the same negative points coming across.

Why is that? - is radiation really that scary to some people - even though they accept (or maybe they choose not too) that they receive doses of natural radiation far higher once up in the air than they would from the artificial (electrically generated) security scan. In addition, and related to my NORM training mentioned above, they are also exposed to radiation exposures on a daily basis which are orders of magnitude higher than a typical back scatter x-ray scan (or set of scans).

In my view this is about civil liberties (whatever that really is) - and I really do think the ‘radiation scare' is used as a convenient excuse - I cannot think of another reason, especially when you are faced with the facts regarding relative exposures from the scan vs exposures once up in the air.

Simon Jenkins of the Guardian

Then an article crops up that turns things all around (as far as the media is concerned) - ‘The proliferation of nuclear panic is politics at its most ghoulish' by Simon Jenkins of the Guardian. The article is interesting simply because it takes a different perspective - ‘The risk from radiation is exaggerated. Worst-case scenario fantasies are used to justify wars that cause many more deaths'. I'm not convinced that there was enough due care and attention in the article (or perhaps Simon has just not read both the books he was advertising). In addition, I cannot really buy into the view that nuclear weapons are not such a big deal (my emphasis). However, the article still has many comments (we offered one) and it is generally pleasing to see that the quality of the responses are better than achieved on the previously mentioned ‘scanner frying' website.

The credibility of the article is somewhat diluted, I think somewhat unintentionally, by the insertion of sentences that might have journalistic merit (adds to a good story) but are in no way related to the topic or science. For example  ‘Only yesterday research suggested that mobile phone radiation may relieve Alzheimer's' - Simon may or may not know that when discussing mobile phones we are talking about micro waves, part of the electromagnetic spectrum and a form of non-ionising radiation. The radiation issues discussed by the authors quoted by Simon are clearly ionising radiation related.

Prof Wade Allison - Radiation & Reason

Simon introduces two authors in his article: Prof Wade Allison (who discusses ‘obsessive safety levels governing nuclear energy') and Prof John Mueller (who looks at the ‘toxic fear associated with radiation from nuclear weapons'). In this blog article I am really looking at Prof Allison's area of interest.

In Simon's article he notes that ‘Allison analyses successive studies into the only serious nuclear accident since Hiroshima, the Chernobyl fire, which killed no more than 60 people, all in close contact with the fire'. This statement may or may not be true - but there are two sides to every story are there not? I make no secret that Ionactive is generally ‘pro-nuclear' and pro-radiation (in terms of the use of ionising radiation for the benefit of mankind). However, it is not reliable to avoid mentioning those that believe the Chernobyl story to be very different.

Greenpeace - Chernobyl death toll grossly underestimated

For example, take the 2006 story from Greenpeace ‘Chernobyl death toll grossly underestimated'. This report claims that  ‘the full consequences of the Chernobyl disaster could top a quarter of a million cancer cases and nearly 100,000 fatal cancers'. The full report can be found here.

Interested readers might also want to look at the UNSCEAR Chernobyl Reports.

Just as I claimed elsewhere (see below) that Prof Allison's book is a good read and well written, I equally can claim the same for the Greenpeace Report. Here then is the problem - which is right? I'm not sure because both are based on the analysis of a significant set of data, and the answer you get may depend on what data you use. Let me use an abstract example to show you the way I am thinking (this also appeared in the media this week): Ancient Woolworths sites.

'Wood for the trees' again?

The Woolworths article written by Matt Parker takes a slightly sarcastic (but entertaining) look at the geographical spread of the famous (now defunct) store across the UK and shows that by being rather ‘selective' with the data (!) you can illustrate some interesting patterns - e.g. Woolworths hunter-gatherer tribes use them in the early days to do their shopping! Of course if you read the article you will see the author was responding to another (serious) investigation into similar patterns in prehistoric monuments across the UK.

Parker concludes that ‘in any sufficiently large set of random data it is possible to find meaningless patterns of any required accuracy'. Ok, so returning to Simon Jenkins article, and specifically my comments relating to Allison vs Greenpeace, I hope you see where I am coming from - the point being that you can use selective data to drive the outcome you want. In saying this I am not claiming that Allison or Greenpeace have deliberately done this - but I think the desired outcome can drive the selection process whatever anyone says (‘wood and trees' comes to mind again!).

I do think this claim can be made directly against the article written by Simon Jenkins - in my view he writes as if he has made up his mind or he is endorsing the books he has read (or partly read). If we really want a serious debate on this issue then all interested parties and research must come together. This is where I agree with Simon where his article headline states ‘politics at its most ghoulish' - but perhaps for a different reason. In my view politics, livelihood, regulators, contractors etc do have an influence on all this - but it is an influence that affects both sides of the argument - not just one side. This is the problem with Simon's article, Prof Allison's book, the Greenpeace report and even the ‘frying traveller' article I first started with.

Returing to Prof Allison - Radiation or Reason



I have the book - Radiation and Reason by Prof Wade Allison. It is a very good read, I do not agree with all of it, but it is very well written and mostly against the grain of current international opinion (by this I mean ICRP, since there are many smaller groups who will argue on the same side as Prof Allison, as well as some who will very much argue against!).

Regardless of my opinion on Allison's conclusions, and I will provide a blog review of these as time allows, he does explain the concepts in a very readable form. For those that might want to dismiss his thoughts - they really should do the decent thing and read it first. Indeed, the same advice should also be accepted by those that might want to discredit the work of Greenpeace - go and read the above mentioned report first.

I would love to put Prof Allison in a room with our ‘Frying traveller' writers and see what happens!

Irrational fears give nuclear power a bad name

And so the Simon Jenkins article kicks off a debate - or is it really a debate? A new article has appeared in the Guardian ‘Irrational fears give nuclear power a bad name, says Oxford scientist'. You know what? - the title ruins the article in my view from the very start - and that is completely compatible with what I said in my above blog article.

Here is what I said this morning (comments left on the Guardian website, 11/1/2009)

I think the comments so far fit into the expected patterns: Some agree Others disagree (probably the majority?) Many of the responses move into areas of nuclear power, cancer clusters etc. You also have the responses from some of the establishment (HPA) and areas of academia (Richard Wakeford). The said responses are entirely as expected as I discussed in my blog on the recent Simon Jenkins article here: http://www.ionactive.co.uk/blog   The problem I have is what exactly is the point of this article? Have the authors read the book by Allison from cover to cover? Have the responders (particularly the 'experts')? I believe that Allison does raise some important issues. I say this as I have read the book. I do not agree with all of what is being said, but significant elements are quite plausible. I also say this as a Radiation Protection Adviser, so if someone wanted to see what camp I am in, then I am in the business of 'protection'. Other than encouraging people like me to make comments, this article will only work (in reality) if it encourages those that are interested (both casual observers and 'experts') to go and READ THE BOOK. As a readable resource I have to say that Allison has done an excellent job. In this world of instant online articles and information readily available at the click of a button I think most people want things in 'black and white' , a subject or article which is easy to compartmentalise. This subject is not that as noted in my above mentioned blog article.