Ionactive Consulting Blog

This is taken from the IAEA News Channel (Nuclear & Radiological Events)

Accident in Industrial Radiography

The incident log for the above event can be read at the following link: IAEA News Channel.

Ionactive Comment

It is perhaps somewhat sad and depressing to start off this blog for 2012 with yet another industrial radiography incident - rather than something more positive. To be fair I have not had the time so far this year to write the blog but when an incident like this occurs (12 January 2012) then something has to be noted.

If you look through this blog and bypass the references to curry and progressive rock music you will see I have identified and noted many incidents involving industrial radiography sources. There were at least two such events I noted in 2011 alone. These events are not always occurring in far off ‘developing' parts of the world either - the last I noted in 2012 was in the US (and they should have known better).

You will note that the report I reference above is provisional and as always only contains a basic summary of the events. Furthermore, the English is a little wonky and so there may still be some interpretation issues that may change the circumstances as current stated. [Aside: Language and interpretation is a real problem I feel with reports coming out of Japan re the nuclear incident at Fukushima. As good as Google translate might be, I think that a lot of ‘would be' media reporters and other interested parties are translating reports and then reporting them as facts. For example, the use of the phrase ‘airborne radiation reading' would imply to me that they were taking ‘radioactivity' measurements in air (e.g. dust sampling). In actual fact, in many cases they are taking direct ‘radiation' measurements above the ground ‘i.e. in air'. It's all down to that language issue and interpretation - if you are not an expert you will not know the difference - and that difference does matter!!].

Back to this report on the radiography accident. The description is a little wonky and it is not clear how many times the source was actually exposed whilst the workers were near the guide tube (where the source is driven into during exposures). Normally (and correctly!) the source is returned to its storage container after each exposure. In this case I think the source was left in the guide tube and then the radiographers spent some time and effort positioning the guide tube where they wanted it. The report talks about this operation (near the guide tube) taking place 40 times. I cannot believe that the same mistake (source left out) occurred 40 times - so I conclude that the exposure was continuous whilst this individual and colleagues went back and forth positioning the guide tube and getting ready to take the shot.

No active dosimety or radiation monitors used?

It is noted that the work took place at night. This is not unusual since open site industrial radiography will normally take place during quiet hours. The report mentions ‘dosimeter' readings so that suggests that at least one individual was wearing some form of dosimetry. However, unless it failed to operate (or be responded to), my reading of the report suggests that this must have been passive (i.e. a film badge or simple TLD). Time and time again industrial radiography accidents are occurring where ‘real time' (active) dosimetry has not been worn. Real time dosimetry will give you instant information about the radiation field, the dose rate, the accumulated dose etc. Even the cheapest types can be set to give you an audible alarm. It appears that there was nothing like this present during the incident.

Notwithstanding lack of dosimetry, where were the real time active monitors (dose rate monitoring equipment?). Was it available but not being used? Was it switched on but left near the source container and not near the guide tube? We do not know these details from the report - a working monitor near the source would have provided instant indication that the source was exposed so that prompt action could be taken. The report says the event was ‘detected' at the end of the job - it is not clear if this was by monitoring, but I suspect this might have been visual (i.e. someone noticed the source in the guide).

Supervision / training / awareness of the potential radiation hazard

What about supervision and training? This is clearly another case of inadequate supervision with the work being carried out by ‘industrial radiographers' who appear not to have a basic awareness of radiation safety. Furthermore, they appear to have little awareness of the hazard potential of the radioactive source. The report indicates that the source was Ir-192 at an activity of 3199.5 GBq (approx 86 Ci). That is a hefty source in terms of activity.

Dose rates from the Ir-192 radioactive source

Expected dose rates at 1m from the source (in air) would be in the region of 361 mSv/h. We have no idea about the working times, however the report indicates that one individual has received 6-7 Gy whole body dose. [For purposes of this blog write up you can assume 1Gy = 1Sv]. Positioning of the guide tube would not (in my view) take hours to perform, and if the report is correct then the individual was back and forth 40 times during this positioning process. [Aside: An alternative interpretation of the report is that 40 radiographic shots were performed, each time the guide tube was repositioned for the next shot with the source exposed. Even with such poor evidence of supervision and training I find it hard to believe that this would have occurred.]. Therefore, it is quite clear that the individual was much nearer to the source than 1m for some of the time.

Dose rates at 10cm would be 36Sv/h and at 5 cm 145 Sv/h. These dose rates illustrate clearly that 6-7 Gy (Sv) whole body dose during this accident is quite possible. The report also suggests > 50Gy to the finger and at the time of writing blistering on day 5 after the incident. This is a clear indication of deterministic (tissue reaction) radiation effects. This individual also displayed mild nausea and vomiting, whilst the other two (who appear to have had radiation exposures in the region of 1-3 Gy whole body dose) just nausea.

Certainly for the most exposed individual these radiation doses are life threatening. 6-7 Gy whole body dose it right at the upper end of what is conventionally said to be survivable (without medical intervention). Even with medical intervention the outlook for this individual is quite grim.

Overall, a totally avoidable incident. It is interesting to note that whilst the media (and ‘would be nuclear reporting experts ...') bang on about Fukushima (yes it is serious, but so is 20,000 drowned people), the radiation doses received in this industrial (non nuclear) accident are orders of magnitude higher than that received by any worker in Japan (based on official and unofficial media reports including IAEA).

I may well update this again as more information becomes available.

Have not had time to write much in the blog over the last few weeks - due to being rather busy (which is good) but also not that well (not so good). However, I thought it was good for my own discipline to put some words down before the end of 2011. As always, as regular readers will know this will be a mixture of Ionactive (work), and Mr Ramsay (everything I do or think about outside work). That said, I concede that often the two merge into one (I am after all Mr Ionactive too). So, without further ado here goes.

Fukushima

By using the title ‘Fukushima' here I am deliberately making the mistake that I believe much of the media has made over the last 9 months or so. The earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011 were devastating. Let us remind ourselves of the power of the tsunami.

Perhaps 20,000 people are dead or missing. Yet, soon after the nuclear issues at Fukushima started, the world (media) almost exclusively followed that story and not much else. Let me be clear - I do believe that the plant failures were (are) a significant event. However, it appears we have lost sight of the bigger picture. Yes, the plant backup systems appear to be flawed, the Japanese government's response has not always been encouraging, yes - using the ICRP standard dosimetry models (which is based on LNT that I am suspicious off), one can predict some statistical cancers that might be created some decades into the future as a result of the incident. However, those statistical cancers should be set against (or compared / balanced with) the overall loss of amenity (including life) from all the ‘non-radiation' aspects of this event in March 2011.

So, who do you believe?

During the last few months some characters have jumped on the bandwagon, and some of these have been picked up in the media. In the diagram below we have Chris Busby to the left and Wade Allison to the right.




A reference for the Busby claim can be found here. A reference for the Allison claim can be found here. A good presentation by Allison, related specifically to Japan, can be found here.

Meanwhile, the law is based on the recommendations of ICRP which I have placed in the middle of the above diagram. One issue I have, being a Radiation Protection Adviser, is that I have to ensure my clients follow the law. Following the law is not just about complying with dose limits, it is about using the principle of ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable), or internationally known as ALARA (as slow as reasonably achievable ...). I might have an opinion on the credibility of dose limits and the current philosophy of radiation protection - but that opinion does not and cannot influence my professional work (and it never well). That said, I do have opinions and these are expressed in this blog and on twitter. So, with respect to the above characters - what do I think? Chris Busby? Well, take a look at this video.

Need I say much more? I was speachless with shock when I first watched this.The whole issue with heart attacks and Cs-137 is completely ridiculous. Just out of interest, if you had been through the devastation (see video above), do you think your heart might be a little over stressed?! He then suggests that they are shipping radioactive material all over Japan to ‘burn it' and therefore ruin a ‘control group' so that Japanese folk later on in life do not have a ‘low incident' cancer group in which to compare their ‘enhanced radiation induced cancer'.

Total and utter stupidity to suggest it. For one, 1 in 4 will die of cancer anyway. In addition, Japan is number 12 in a list of 121 countries in terms of consumption of cigarettes. Cigarettes are going to kill more people than this event will ever do. Indeed, you will not even detect radiation induced cancers (if they were to occur).

Busby then concludes that we need to give everyone large doses of calcium to block the Cs-137. Even if this has any basis at all, it is the way that this is then delivered / offered. This is picked up in the media in this article ‘Christopher Busby Sells "Useless" & Overpriced Anti-Radiation Pills'. Seriously, if this chap has any credibility at all - if any of his arguments had any validity at all - he has blown it big time.

The so called European Committee on Radiation Risk (ECRR) might sound grand but it is really the vehicle that Busby uses to communicate his own ideas. These in the main have not been peer reviewed by recognised groups and other commentators have discounted them. I have no room (or will!) in this blog to go into all the details - many other blogs and resources out there have done so. There are some aspects of his arguments which might have some basis e.g. internally incorporated radioactive material. He argues you cannot apply absorbed dose calculations by averaging over the organ of interest. However, any credibility he might have is evaporated when he starts suggesting Japan is moving radioactive material around the county to ‘enhance background levels of cancer' as noted above. To give some balance I supply two 'CV' type documents for Prof Busby - one made 'for him' (you will see what I mean) and one which he created himself (in response to the first).

• Chris Busby Exposed (source unknown)
• Chris Busby Exposed (by Chris Busby)

Turning to Wade Allison. I confess I really like this chap and I was probably one of the first to buy his book ‘Radiation and Reason'. I think the book overall is well written and regardless of whether you agree with its conclusions, it is quite easy to read and is recommended. (I wish I could say the same for the ECRR above, but if you read it you have to try and ignore the comments and howling complaints thought out - something Radiation and Reason does not suffer from).

Part of Allison's book suggests that society is able to accept risk (e.g. 1:1000) for the good of society (e.g. Nuclear Energy to provide power for our grandchildren). This is at odds with the Busby approach which is based on any risk above ‘background' not being justifiable where it might be radiation induced (see para 3 here). Allison's treatment of threshold effects is also interesting (the sun will burn you above a threshold, but not below it), but does not address perhaps the view that some level of sun below that threshold might actually be doing you good. The simple reader analogy (bridges, pills and sun) does not always describe well the actual potential mechanism for DNA damage (and repair) - which is so important in defining LNT (Linear No Threshold) Model. I guess my main beef with the work is that when Allison looks at the data for cancers below 100mSv and concludes there is no evidence for this below 100 mSv, he seems to be justifying this (in effect) because there is so little data below 100mSv!

This is expanded further to suggest later on in the book that tissue recovery from a 100mSv dose (e.g. during a session of radio therapy), given a nominal one month recovery period, could be related to cell level damage repair. The suggestion is then made that this same cell repair might provide a threshold for cancer induction. In summary I think a major issue with the book is that it is difficult to peer review - it is mostly about an ‘opinion' or a collection of 'ideas'. By being written for the masses, in order to get his important message across, much of the ‘meat' is missing in which to get your teeth into and form a peer reviewed scientific opinion. Notwithstanding all this, I still like much of this book. The links below takes you to some specific information on Wade Allison.

• Professor Wade Allison - Keeble College
• Prof Wade Allison (Wiki)

There are other players in the mix that I have not mentioned specifically - if you are interested you can look them up (Helen Caldicott, Arnie Gundersen, Richard Wakefield etc). Two sit one side of the fence, the other sits the other.

But what if you believe / accept LNT / ICRP and current dose limits?

So there you have it. Meanwhile, as suggest above, until the law says otherwise I deal with the recommendations of ICRP and the laws made under them (in the UK that is the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1999). The thing is, and I think the media / public still miss this trick, regardless of who ‘is right' (see above) the risk levels under the current system (about 5% / Sv, or written another way, 1:20000 fatal cancer risk for an effective whole body dose of 1mSv) is still low compared to other industrial processes, living and life in general. For the people of Japan, like it or not, you have to compare radiation risk with other risks that they face: now, next week, next decade. I am sure that radiation risk will form a small component of the overall risks they will face (based on ICRP). Where radiation ‘fear' is disproportionately exaggerated above its status then the people will suffer from all those non-radiation issues (which may be potentially much more serious). I think it is quite likely that the evacuation of people will end in more ‘non-radiation' induced deaths then they are trying to save by keeping them away from contaminated zones.

Despite all this, and accepting that Germany are certainly against the flow, nuclear energy in the world is not going to reduce - it is increasing and will continue to do so. I say this with no particular smugness for my own career aspirations. I work on the fringes of the industry only, 99% of my work is outside the industry.

No, I say it with relief (for my children and their children).

Ionactive this year / next year

It is true to say that 2011 started off a little slower than I would have liked. The routine compliance work was still in place, but the more project related work was less prevalent. This all began to turn around from about July onwards and the last six months has been hectic. Never have we been so nicely booked up for the first three months of the New Year at the close of the previous year.

Our training work this year has been extensive both in the UK and beyond. Earlier this year we ran a three day ‘R & N in CBRN' (radiation safety) course for the UK police service. We followed that up later in the year with a one day refresher course for the police which was very successful. Our UK Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) courses were also well attended with excellent delegate feedback.

A great success this year was teaming up in an association arrangement with RNA Safety International in Dubai where we ran three 3-day Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) courses. These were very well received and there are plans to run many more during 2012. In fact we created an International Radiation Safety Training page just for our courses outside the UK.

For the first quarter of 2012 we have three emergency services (UK) courses booked and ready to go and three routine RPS Training courses (all with good ample bookings already). We are also running a bespoke two day safety course for a medical linear accelerator company. So, all in all, 2012 looks like a good start (certainly compared to this time last year!).

Ionactive App / YouTube Resource

Due to being so busy during the last three months of 2011 we slowed the production of our Ionactive App (for iPhone, iPad, Android and web platforms). However, we and the designer / programmer (Grallator Limited), are ready to roll for 2012. We will also be bringing out some new YouTube resource early in 2012 - looking at ‘magnitudes, units and risks' - something we think has been handled very badly this year by the media when reporting on Fukushima.

Mr Ramsay

So what about Mr Ramsay (as opposed to Mr Ionactive) - what does 2012 hold? Getting rid of some excess weight for sure! I weighed myself today and was horrified to see 16.5 stone on the scales. I knew I was overweight and needed to do something about it, but enough is enough. A diet starts tomorrow morning.

Those following this blog and my twitter account will know I am very keen on cooking asian and chilli based foods. Far from looking at the diet as compromising my cooking, I am going to relish the challenge of creating dishes that are part of that diet. Indeed, I am going to diet on curry (as far as I can).

I will try to get up in the air during the coming year and get some more hours under my belt. However, I really do not have the time (or money!) to seriously move my private pilot's license forward much at the moment, so will just be satisfied with the experience and leave it at that.

Another love of mine is music - I plan to spend more time listening to it and investigating even more exciting bands and especially progressive rock.

Lastly, but by no means least, I plan to spend more quality time with my wife and boys. Running Ionactive is time consuming and I must improve my work life balance.

A happy and healthy New Year to you all.

This is taken from the IAEA News Channel (Nuclear & Radiological Events)

Hazardous manipulation of a lightning rod with Ra-226

The incident log for the above event can be read at the following link: IAEA News Channel.

Ionactive Comment

In the grand scheme of things not a significant dose to the member of public (in terms of likely health effects), but the estimated whole body dose is above the public dose limit if 1mSv per year). In terms of work practice this event is significant - it is bad enough to be a radiographer and negligently work with radioactive sources when you should know better, its worse in my view when a member of public is involved who knows no different. For the purposes of regulation this person would be classed as a member of the public.

I am not really sure that this event should be reported in this way on the IAEA INES system. The problem is that those that know little about nuclear matters, but are against them, will use the site as a demonstration of the nuclear industry at its worse (my emphasise). Here is an example. Take a look at this site: http://www.climatesceptics.org/event/956 "Nuclear Power in Europe - Nuclear power related activities in Europe".

You will note that they also feature INES entries as I do on this very blog, but appear to comment little on them. My point here is that a lightening rod with a small Ra-226 source has nothing whatsoever to do with the nuclear industry. So why feature the story on their website?

I only wish there were similar INES (IAEA) related sites that looked at mishaps in the chemical industry - would we see similar sites featuring each and every oil spill, chemical release, injury and similar?

Well what a week! First, reports come through that these units are banned in the EC. Then we learn that they have not actually been ‘banned' but have not been placed on an approved list. One might think perhaps that this was partly due to the screening devices (e.g. the Rapiscan Secure 1000 systems) not being any good at its job (i.e. security screening). Unfortunately, from what I can see this has nothing to do with their performance and everything to do with their ‘safety' (or lack of). The EC announcement states the following at the bottom.

"In order not to risk jeopardising citizens' health and safety, only security scanners which do not use X-ray technology are added to the list of authorised methods for passenger screening at EU airports. All other technologies, such as that used for mobiles phones and others, can be used provided that they comply with EU security standards."

Much of the media took this to be a ban - it is not. As reported by the BBC, Manchester airport will continue to test the units. A report is apparently due March 2012.

Current system of Radiation Protection (ICRP)

In radiation protection we have Justification, Optimisation and Limitation. In the EU / UK the use of x-ray back scatter units has been justified previously. The general principle of radiation protection (based on ICRP) is that you should not use ionising radiation if you find an alternative method that meets your objectives. So this might be why some are turning to the mm wave systems. However, that implies that the x-ray back scatter systems are inferior with respect to their security performance. If the x-ray systems are so dire, then how come the mm wave systems are so much better? The above mentioned EC report states the following:

"Security scanners are an effective method of screening passengers as they are capable of detecting both metallic and non-metallic items carried on a person. The scanner technology is developing rapidly and has the potential to significantly reduce the need for manual searches ("pat-downs") applied to passengers, crews and airport staff."

Now, I am not an expert in security - so I cannot say if screening (using mm wave or x-rays) provides a significant security advantage. However, what the above paragraph implies is that the EC do believe they provide an advantage. So, are we then saying that on a scale of perhaps 1-100 (for example), the security advantage of mm wave is 100 and the x-ray system is 1? If that were the case then under ALARA (see below) it would be more difficult to justify using x-rays.

If the scale was perhaps 50:50 (i.e. both systems just as good), then in my view there is no question that either system could be used - based on the risks involved (negligible). But even then, according to the ICRP principles, one should not choose the x-ray system (since there is a non-ionising radiation system which is just as good).

However, suppose the scale is such that the x-ray system scores 75 and the mm wave system 25? Then there is absolutely no question that the x-ray system should be used.

Use ALARA correctly - or not at all

It is my view that this issue does not come down to performance it comes down to politics and misunderstanding. The principle of ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable...etc) means that the benefit of an exposure has to outweigh the risks of that exposure. Therefore, if the EC are saying that the exposures from the x-ray screening devices are dangerous (jeopardising citizens health and safety), then this must imply they are also saying that the x-ray units are crap (to be frank). The reason I say this is that the maximum dose per screening is around 0.06 microSv effective dose or less (and the unit of effective dose is important here - it accounts for skin doses etc). That dose is negligible / trivial / tiny and therefore if this is still considered ‘dangerous' then it is implicit (if ALARA has been used correctly) that the x-ray screening devices are so damn rubbish that they should be dumped in a skip.

As I have pointed out above - the EC have stated that the systems do have a security advantage - so what are they saying??

Collective Dose

In addition, many have reported / predicted numbers of cancer deaths that might be attributed to passengers using these devices. This is based on the concept of Collective Dose (that is the summing of a whole load of smaller doses and then making risk / cancer predictions based on the current LNT approach adopted by ICRP). This is an invalid approach and even ICRP say the same (see section K, page 13).

"(k) The collective effective dose quantity is an instrument for optimisation, for comparing radiological technologies and protection procedures, predominantly in the context of occupational exposure. Collective effective dose is not intended as a tool for epidemiological risk assessment, and it is inappropriate to use it in risk projections. The aggregation of very low individual doses over extended time periods is inappropriate, and in particular, the calculation of the number of cancer deaths based on collective effective doses from trivial individual doses should be avoided."

That is just what all these reports you read have done. They have taken those trivial individual doses and calculated number of deaths over extended time period. Wrong!

This is taken from the IAEA News Channel (Nuclear & Radiological Events)

Overexposure of workers at irradiation Facility

The incident log for the above event can be read at the following link: IAEA News Channel.

Ionactive Comment

A detailed description of the event. We wrote about this in the blog earlier this year (before all details were known).

As I have said repeatedly in blog comments for a number of recent radiation incidents, there is absolutely no excuse in 2011 not to have active monitoring during work with ionising radiation. Whilst the film badge or TLD is still widely recognised as the device for formally recording exposures (i.e. for dose records), the active dosimeter should now be one of the key devices for all such similar work. A typical device is shown below.



The device you see above cost me about £550 plus VAT. A small price to pay when you consider what it does (the cost-benefit is rather more obvious still when you consider the 5.63 Gy received by one of the workers)

In addition to active dosimetry, I would expect to have portable or fixed (or both) gamma radiation alarms in situ whilst this sort of work is completed. It is unbelievable to suggest that the workers involved had been adequately trained (and supervised) if they did not have these key safety devices present.